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Representative Cases

Budow and Noble, P.C., has been a cornerstone of jurisprudence in Maryland and the District of Columbia for over two decades. Our attorneys have been and continue to be major participants in the development of legal precedents that now serve as the guidelines for our legal community. While a few examples are set forth below, we encourage you to contact us should you wish to discuss these decisions or any other matters.

GEICO v. Comer, 419 Md. 89, 18 A.3d 830 (2011)

Anne K. Howard, Esq. at trial

Richard E. Schimel, Esq., and Anne K. Howard, Esq. on appeal

Resident insured, who was injured in accident by tortfeasor's automobile while riding his motorcycle, filed a petition for declaratory judgment that the automobile insurer under his father's policy was obligated to pay underinsured motorist benefites to him. The Court of Appeals held that the motorcycle owned and operated by insured at time of accident was excluded from coverage under policy, due to the applicability of an exclusion from UM/UIM coverage for bodily injury to an insured while the insured is occupying a vehicle owned by the insured but not covered by the liability provisions of that policy. The Court of Appeals noted that one valid purpose to such an exclusion, as well as Maryland Code, Insurance § 19-509(f)(1), was to prevent a family, owning several vehicles, from insuring only one or two of them with an insurer, leaving the other vehicles uninsured or underinsured under a different policy, and being able to claim UM/UIM benefits from the first insurer even though no premium was paid to the first insurer for coverage of the other vehicles.

Allstate Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 363 Md. 106, 767 A.2d 831 (2001)

Michael J. Budow, Esq. and Laura Basem Jacobs, Esq. at trial

Michael J. Budow, Esq., Richard E. Schimel, Esq., and Laura Basem Jacobs, Esq. on appeal

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a breach of the cooperation clause by an insured in failing to participate in discovery and attend trial amounts to actual prejudice to an automobile liability insurer under Ann. Maryland Code, Insurance § 19-110, entitling the insurer to disclaim all coverage to the insured, where the insured’s willful conduct has, or may reasonably have, precluded the insurer from establishing a legitimate jury issue of the insured's liability or the claimant’s damages.

Ball v. Martin, 108 Md. App. 435, 672 A.2d 143 (1996)

Allan A. Noble, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals determined that a party waives the right to raise a Batson challenge regarding the opposing side’s strike of a juror based upon gender, when the objection to the strike is not raised until after a hearing addressing that party’s objection to the strike based upon race.

Berzups v. H. G. Smithy Co., 22 Md. App. 157, 321 A.2d 801 (1974)

Michael J. Budow, Esq. and Allan A. Noble, Esq. at trial and on appeal

Pedestrians, who with knowledge of a danger, fail to follow a different safe route in order to avoid an appreciated danger via a different route, are contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 873 A.2d 1122 (2003)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. and Michael J. Budow, Esq. on appeal

As a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Article IV, § 22, of the Maryland Constitution precludes the Court of Special Appeals from exercising jurisdiction over an “appeal” taken by a party who was an appellee in a court in banc, but the party is usually entitled to seek further appellate review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals.

Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County Council, 309 Md. 683, 526 A.2d 598 (1987)

Allan A. Noble, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Court of Appeals determined that a civic association and property owners who challenged procedures leading to the designation of land adjacent to them on the city's master plan as suitable for a mineral resource recovery zone, which was a prerequisite to the adoption of the zone, presented a justiciable issue cognizable in a declaratory judgment action pursuant to Code 1957, Art. 28, §§ 7-108(b, d), 7-111, 8-101. In addition, the adoption of an amendment to the city's master plan by the planning commission and county council was not a “contested case” subject to appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Campbell v. Noble, --- A.2d ---, 2008 WL 5244502, D.C., December 18, 2008 (NO. 06-CV-1430)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

Notice that a tenant's dog is dangerous is not sufficient to hold a landlord liable for its actions, absent a clause in the lease giving the landlord some degree of control over the premises. In addition, a landlord does not become an owner or harborer of his tenant's dog under D.C. Code § 8-1901 (4) simply by virtue of being a landlord. Even if a landlord were to be deemed a harborer of a tenant's dog, nothing in the statutory scheme imposes liability on the owner or harborer in the absence of an administrative determination that the dog is dangerous.

Chase v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 780 A.2d 1123 (D.C. 2001)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the earth movement exclusion of a homeowners' insurance policy was not limited to naturally occurring events and, therefore, the exclusion applied to earth movement caused by water from a frozen pipe. Moreover, the sump pump rider to the homeowners' insurance policy which covered losses from overflow was subject to the earth movement exclusion, and, thus, the policy did not cover losses from movement of saturated soil resulting from a sump pump failure.

Choharis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, --- A.2d ---, 2008 WL 5244522, D.C., December 18, 2008 (NO. 06-CV-234)

Michael J. Budow, Esq. and Laura Basem Jacobs, Esq. below

Michael J. Budow, Esq., Richard E. Schimel, Esq., and Laura Basem Jacobs, Esq. on appeal

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the broad tort of first party insurance bad faith, finding that disputes relating to the obligations under an insurance contract should be generally addressed within the principals of law relating to contracts, and bad faith conduct can be compensated within those principles as opposed to creating a separate cause of action. It is only where there is an independent duty flowing from considerations other than the contractual relationship, resulting in an independent injury over and above the contracted-for benefit, where the breach of contact remedy would reach none of the damages suffered by the tort, that a separate tort cause of action (including fraud, invasion of privacy, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and conspiracy) may stand.

Formica v. Cascade Candle Company, 125 F.Supp.2d 552 (D.D.C. 2001)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that personal jurisdiction could not be established over a manufacturer under the District of Columbia's long-arm statute merely because the manufacturer had sold goods to a nationwide distributor who, in turn, had distributed the goods at issue to a store in the District of Columbia.

James v. Butler, 378 Md. 683, 838 A.2d 1180 (2003)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial

Michael J. Budow, Esq. and Richard E. Schimel, Esq. on appeal

The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that a plaintiff who introduces his medical records without expert testimony through the evidentiary shortcut provided by Ann. Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 10-104(c), is precluded from recovering more than $25,000.00, the jurisdictional limit of the District Court, notwithstanding the fact that the case was removed from the District Court and tried in the Circuit Court and the jury's verdict was for $310,000.

Johnson v. Hobson, 505 A.2d 1313 (D.C. 1986)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a condominium association has the authority to promulgate a parking regulations covering its property where the regulation was passed only after the association received numerous complaints, the regulation was not applied discriminatorily or unfairly, the regulation was adopted pursuant to proper procedures, and the condominium owners received 12 months notice before it was put into effect.

Mallard v. Earl, 106 Md. App. 449, 665 A.2d 287 (1995)

Anne K. Howard, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Court of Appeals of Maryland modified the Boulevard Rule and declined to afford absolute protection to the favored driver who was proceeding in an unlawful manner where the unlawful conduct was a proximate cause of the collision.

McQuiggan v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 73 Md. App. 705, 536 A.2d 137 (1988)

Allan A. Noble, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that a 12 year old minor is capable of assuming the risk of his actions, thereby barring his claim.

Mundey v. Erie Insurance Group, 396 Md. 656, 914 A.2d 1167 (2007)

Anne K. Howard, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that one is not a resident relative of the household for the purposes of awarding uninsured motorist benefits where he is currently living outside the household but he intends to return to that household. Rather, the Court will apply a totality of the circumstances test to determine residency. Moreover, the policy definition of “resident” was not an exclusion and did not violate public policy.

Reames v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 111 Md. App. 546, 683 A.2d 179 (1996), cert. denied 686 A2.d 635

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals held that an insurer does not have a duty to defend an insured against claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, for which there is no coverage under the insured’s policy, where there is also no potential of coverage for additional causes of action that are not asserted.

Redmond v. State Farm Insurance Company, 728 A.2d 1202 (D.C. 1999)

Allan A. Noble, Esq. and Laura Basem Jacobs, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a liability insurer is not equitably stopped from relying on a policy exclusion for lead paint claims even where the certificate of insurance indicates “all risk coverage,” the agent represents the policy as the best coverage available, and the promotional material does not set forth the lead paint exclusion. The Court also upheld the insured’s duty to read the policy and found that an insured was contributorily negligent for failing to read the policy which therefore barred recovery.

Reichardt v. Flynn, 374 Md. 361, 823 A.2d 566, 148 Lab.Cas. P59,743, 177 Ed. Law Rep. 357,

19 IER Cases 1721 (2003)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals and found that the communications by students and their parents to school officials alleging that a teacher engaged in sexual harassment and discrimination were protected by absolute privilege, and thus, those communications cannot serve the basis for a defamation claim by a teacher.

Ritz v. Meyers, 85 Md. App. 714, 584 A.2d 1306 (1991)

Allan A. Noble, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Court of Special Appeals held that the statements by a defendant’s employee were inadmissible hearsay as opposed to an admission of an agent when the statements were made two weeks after the occurrence, as the Court concluded that the statements were not contemporaneous to the occurrence.

Shapiro v. Massengill, 105 Md. App. 743, 661 A.2d 202 (1995), cert, denied, 668 A.2d 36

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Court of Special Appeals found that misconduct that renders employee incompatible with an employer may constitute “just cause” even if the action is not actually injurious to the employer's business or gross or evil, where the employee is in position requiring trust and the employer has a reasonable belief that employee is untrustworthy.

Smith v. State Farm, 169 Md. App. 286, 900 A.2d 301 (2006)

Walter E. Gillcrist, Jr., Esq. at trial and on appeal

The fact that State Farm regularly carries on business in Baltimore City and that Plaintiff chose Baltimore City for venue is insufficient to outweigh the convenience of the parties and witnesses in Montgomery County and the ties between the issues in the case to Montgomery County, and therefore the Maryland Court of Special Appeals upheld the lower court’s transfer of the case to Montgomery County.

St Louis v. Beckles, 81 Md. App. 41, 566 A.2d 787 (1989)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that a judgment finding one defendant not liable does not abrogate that defendant’s status as a joint tort-feasor pursuant to a release which designates that defendant as a joint-tortfeasor, and therefore the liable defendant is entitled to a reduction of any judgment entered against him to the extent that the settlement with the non-liable party exceeded the pro rata share of one half.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Crisfulli, 156 Md.App.515, 847 A.2d 504 (2004)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals determined that a tortfeasor’s vehicle was not an “uninsured motor vehicle,” within the meaning of Ann. Maryland Code, Insurance § 19-509(a), where the single limit for liability of $50,000 for the tortfeasor’s policy exceeded the $25,000 per person limit of liability for the UM coverage of the second policy, despite the fact that there were four injured claimants resulting in an apportionment of payments, the largest of which $28,451, an amount greater than the $25,000 liability limit for the UM coverage. The Court specifically rejected the claimant’s argument that the tortfeasor’s vehicle qualified as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under § 19-509(a)(2)(ii) because the amount available to her under that policy ($28,541) was less than the $50,000 per accident limit of liability on the second policy’s UM coverage.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. DeHaan, 169 Md. 163, 900 A.2d 208 (2006)

Anne K. Howard, Esq. below

Michael J. Budow, Esq. and Anne K. Howard, Esq. on appeal

Interpreting the Maryland uninsured motorist statute, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the statute requires a direct causal relationship between the injury and the actual use of a vehicle. As such, the Court found no coverage for an insured who was shot by an assailant sitting in the driver seat while in the course of steeling the insured car, as discharging the firearm had nothing to do with the use of the vehicle.

Stearman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 381 Md. 436, 849 A.2d 539 (2004)

Michael J. Budow, Esq. below

Michael J. Budow, Esq., Richard E. Schimel, Esq., and Laura Basem Jacobs, Esq. on appeal

The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the household exclusion’s limit of liability coverage to the statutory minimum although the automobile policy may otherwise provide liability coverage in excess of the statutory minimum liability limits.

Stepney v. Dildy, 128 F.R.D. 77 (D. Md. 1989)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland excluded a human factors expert from testifying where his testimony that there was precipitation in the area on the evening on which a social guest slipped and fell, that the temperature was sufficiently cold to freeze any such precipitation, that there was insufficient illumination on driveway, that the change and slope of the driveway may have “kinesthetically” led the guest to believe that he was already at the street, and that the slope of driveway may have violated building construction standards was not entirely supported by otherwise demonstrable fact, some of it related to matters within the common knowledge of the jury, and it had the risk of being more prejudicial than helpful to the trier of fact pursuant to Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 702, 28 U.S.C.A.

Washington v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 629 A.2d 24 (D.C. App. 1993)

Richard E. Schimel, Esq. at trial and on appeal

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that an insurer owed no duty to defend an insured against allegations that the insured made defamatory statements injuring his professional reputation as the damages did not involve “bodily injury” or “property damage” within the meaning of a standard homeowner's policy. Moreover, an insurer’s reservation of its right to deny coverage for a defamation claim is sufficient to preserve the insurer's right to deny coverage for defense costs incurred by insured in the underlying action, as a reservation to deny “coverage” refers to both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify.

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